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Abstract
A consistency criterion for price impact functions in limit order markets is pro-
posed that prohibits chain arbitrage exploitation. Both the bid-ask spread and the
feedback of sequential market orders of the same kind onto both sides of the order
book are essential to ensure consistency at the smallest time scale. All the stocks
investigated in Paris Stock Exchange have consistent price impact functions.
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1 Introduction
Mainstream finance and mathematical finance suppose that the price dynam-
ics follows a random walk [1,5]. This is an extreme point of view describing
an average idealised behaviour that does not account for every detail of the
microscopic price dynamics. And indeed extreme assumptions are most useful
in a theoretical framework. This is why the opposite one is worth considering
[4]: suppose that trader 0 is active at time t; he buys/sells a given amount of
shares n0, leading to (log-)price change r(t) = r0, where t is in transaction
time, t being the t-th transaction. In addition, one also assumes that trader 1
has perfect information about t and r0 and exploits it accordingly.
A related situation is found in Ref. [6] whose main result is that a arbitrage
opportunity, when exploited, does not disappear but is spread around t. It is
a counter-intuitive outcome, that raises two questions: how to accommodate
the never-disappearing arbitrage, and how microscopic arbitrage removal is
possible at all at this time scale. This proceeding, a short version of Ref. [4],
suggests that real markets remove arbitrage on a single transaction basis by a
double feedback of the last transactions on the order book.
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The price impact function I(n) is by definition the relative price change caused
by a transaction of n (integer) shares (n > 0 for buying, n < 0 for selling);
mathematically,
p(t+ 1) = p(t) + I(n), (1)
where p(t) is the log-price and t is in transaction time. The above notation
misleadingly suggests that I does not depend on time. In reality, I is not
only subject to random fluctuations (which will be neglected here), but also,
for instance, to feed-back from the type of market orders which has a long
memory (see e.g. [3,8,2,7] for discussions about the dynamical nature of market
impact). Neglecting the dynamics of I requires us to consider specific shapes
for I that enforce some properties of price impact for each transaction, whereas
in reality they only hold on average. For example, one should restrict oneself
to the class of functions that makes it impossible to obtain round-trip positive
gains [6]. But the inappropriateness of constant price impact functions is all
the more obvious as soon as one considers how price predictability is removed
by speculation, which is inter-temporal by nature.
The most intuitive (but wrong) view of market inefficiency is to regard price
predictability as a scalar deviation from the unpredictable case: if there were a
relative price deviation r0 caused by a transaction of n0 shares at some time t,
according to this view, one should exchange n1 shares so as to cancel perfectly
this anomaly, where n1 is such that I(n1) = −r0. This view amounts to re-
garding predictability as something that can be remedied with a single trade.
However, the people that would try and cancel r0 would not gain anything by
doing it unless they are market makers who try to stabilise the price.
It is most instructive to understand how constant price impact functions are
paradoxical by considering a simple example. Trader 1, a perfectly (and pos-
sibly illegally) informed speculator, will take advantage of his knowledge by
opening a position at time t− 1 and closing it at time t+1. It is important to
be aware that if one places an order at time t, the transaction takes place at
price p(t + 1). Provided that trader 0 buys/sells n0 shares irrespective of the
price that he obtains, the round-trip of trader 1 yields a monetary gain of
g1 = n1[e
p(t+2) − ep(t)] = n1e
p0[eI(n0) − eI(n1)]
where p0 is the log-price before any trader considered here makes a transac-
tion. Since I(n) generally increases with n, there is an optimal n∗1 number of
shares that maximises g1. The discussion so far is a simplification, in real-
money instead of log-money space, of the one found in Ref. [6]. One should
note that far from diminishing price predictability, the intervention of trader
1 increases the fluctuations. Therefore, in the framework of constant price im-
pact functions, an isolated arbitrage opportunity never vanishes but becomes
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less and less exploitable because of the fluctuations, thus the reduction, of
signal-to-noise ratio caused by the speculators.
It seems that trader 1 cannot achieve a better gain than by holding n∗1 shares
at time t. Since the actions of trader 1 do not modify in any way the arbitrage
opportunity between t−2 and t+2, he can inform a fully trusted friend, trader
2, of the gain opportunity on the condition that the latter opens his position
before t − 1 and closes it after t + 1 so as to avoid modifying the relative
gain of trader 1. 1 For instance, trader 2 informs trader 1 when he has opened
his position and trader 1 tells trader 2 when he has closed his position. From
the point of view of trader 2, this is very reasonable because the resulting
action of trader 1 is to leave the arbitrage opportunity unchanged to r0 since
p(t+1)−p(t−1) = r0. Trader 2 will consequently buy n
∗
2 = n
∗
1 shares at time
t − 2 and sell them at time t + 2, earning the same return as trader 1. This
can go on until trader i has no fully trusted friend. Note that the advantage
of trader 1 is that he holds a position over a smaller time interval, thereby
increasing his return rate; in addition, since trader 2 increases the opening
price of trader 1, the absolute monetary gain of trader 1 actually increases
provided that he has enough capital to invest. Before explaining why this
situation is paradoxical, it makes sense to emphasise that the gains of traders
i > 0 are of course obtained at the expense of trader 0, and that the result
the particular order of the traders’ actions is to create a bubble which peaks
at time t + 1.
The paradox is the following: if trader 1 is alone, the best return that can be
extracted from his perfect knowledge is gˆ1(n
∗
1) according to the above reason-
ing. When there are N traders in the ring of trust, the total return extracted
is N times the optimal gain of a single trader. Now, assume that trader 1 has
two brokering accounts; he can use each of his accounts, respecting the order
in which to open and close his positions, effectively earning the optimal return
on each of his accounts. The paradox is that his actions would be completely
equivalent to investing n∗1 and then n
∗
1 from the same account. In particular,
in the case of I(n) = n, this seems a priori exactly similar to grouping the
two transactions into 2n∗1, but this results of course in a return smaller than
the optimal return for a doubled investment. Hence, in this framework, trader
1 can earn as much as pleases provided that he splits his investment into
sub-parts of n∗1 shares whatever I is, as long as it is constant.
This paradox seems too good to be present in real markets. As a consequence,
one should rather consider its impossibility as an a contrario consistency crite-
rion for price impact functions. Let us introduce the two relevant mechanisms
1 If trader 2 were not a good friend, trader 1 could in principle ask trader 2 to open
his position after him and to close it after him, thus earning more. But relationships
with real friends are supposed to egalitarian in this paper.
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that are at work in real markets.
Half of the solution lies in the dynamics of the order book, particularly the
reaction of the order book to a sequence of market orders of the same kind.
Generically, the impact of a second market order of the same kind and size
is smaller by a factor κ1 than that of the first one, and similarly by a factor
κ2 for a third one, etc [9,7]. To this contraction of market impact on one side
also corresponds an increase of market impact on the other side for the next
market order of opposite type [9]; therefore, we shall assume that the impact
function on the other side is divided by θ1 after the first market order, by θ2θ1
after the second, etc. As shown in the next section, κ1 ≃ κ2 is a very good
approximation when κ1 and κ2 are averaged over all the stocks, hence we shall
only use κ; for the same reason, we assume that θ1 = θ2 = θ.
2 Feedback
In order to investigate whether the feedback restricted on the side on which
the first sequential market orders are placed is enough to make price impact
consistent, one sets θ = 1. In the case of log price impact functions, the optimal
number of shares and gain of trader 1 are
n∗1 =
nκ0
(γ + 1)1/γ
(2)
and
g∗1 = e
p0n
κ(γ+1)
0
γ
(γ + 1)1+1/γ
. (3)
These two equations already show that the reaction of the limit order book
reduces the gain opportunity of player 1. Adding trader 2 will reduce further
the impact of trader 0, hence the gain of trader 1, and, as before, trader 2
should pay for it. In this case, the reduction of gain of trader 1 is
∆g1
ep0
= [g∗1 − g1(n
∗
1, n2)]e
−p0 = n
κ(γ+1)
0
γ
(γ + 1)1+1/γ
−nγ2
n
γ(1+κγ)
0
(γ + 1)1/γ+κ
[n
−γκ(1−κ)
0 (γ + 1)− 1], (4)
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while the gain that trader 2 optimises is
G2
ep0
= nγ+12

 1
nκγ2
n
κγ(2κ−1)
0
(1 + γ)κ−1
− 1

− ∆g1
ep0
. (5)
Trader 1’s impact functions are κI when he opens his position and I when he
closes it, which is an additional cause of loss for trader 1, which must be also
compensated for by trader 2. Fortunately for the latter, his impact functions
are I when opening and κI when closing his position. Therefore, provided
that κ is large enough so as not to make κ2I(n0) too small, trader 2 can earn
more than trader 1 in some circumstances. Impact functions are inconsistent
when G∗2 > 0, n
∗
1 > 1 and n
∗
2 > 1 for log impact functions. It turns out that
the regions in which G∗2 > 0 while n
∗
1 > 1 are disjoint if κ < κc ≃ 0.5 for log
impact functions.
As previously mentioned, the feedback acts on both order book sides. Assum-
ing that θ1 = θ2 = κ in order to be able to use available market measurements,
one finds a critical value of κ of about 0.83 for log price impact functions. For
this value, only a small area of inconsistent impact functions, corresponding
to n0 ≃ 1.5, still exists in the (n0, γ) plane, but cannot be reached since both
n0 = 1 and 2 are outside of the inconsistent region. Therefore, even double
feedback does not guarantee consistency
3 Empirical data
The values of κ1 and κ2 can be measured in real markets. The response func-
tion R(δt, V ) = 〈(p(t+ δt)− p(t))ǫ(t)〉|V (t)=V is the average price change af-
ter δt trades, conditional on the sign of the trade ǫ(t) and on volume V ;
similarly, one defines the response function conditional on two trades of the
same sign R+(δt, V ) = 〈(p(t+ δt)− p(t))ǫ(t)〉|ǫ(t)=ǫ(t−1),V (t)=V , and R
++(δt) =
〈(p(t+ δt)− p(t))ǫ(t)〉|ǫ(t)=ǫ(t−1)=ǫ(t−2), V (t) = V . A key finding of Refs [3,2] is
that R factorises into R(δt)F (V ). Thus we will be interested in R(δt), R+(δt)
and R++(δt).
Using measures kindly provided by J.-Ph. Bouchaud and J. Kockelkoren, one
finds that the estimate of this ratio κˆ = 〈R+(1)〉/〈R(1)〉 ∈ [0.86, 1.02], that
the average over all stocks κˆ1 = 0.97 ± 0.04 and κˆ2 = 〈R
++(1)〉/〈R+(1)〉 ∈
[0.87, 1.01], while κˆ2 = 0.97±0.03. ; for a given stock, there is some correlation
between κ1 and κ2; the data presented here does not contain error bars for
the measures of R, R+ and R++. The approximation κ1 ≃ κ2 is reasonable,
and we shall from now on call κ = (κ1 + κ2)/2 and replace κ1 and κ2 by κ
everywhere.
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Fig. 1. Average daily volume versus n0,min (same data set)
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Fig. 2. Fraction of daily volume needed to inject an exploitable arbitrage versus κ
(same data set)
In other words there is some variations between the stocks, some of them
being less sensitive to successive market orders of the same kind. The values
of estimated κ start at 0.86. Therefore, even feedback on both book sides does
not yield consistent log impact functions. One concludes that the feedback of
the order book is not enough to make price impact functions consistent.
4 Spread
The above discussion neglects the bid-ask spread s. It is of great importance
in practice, as the impact of one trade is on average of the same order of
magnitude as the spread [9]. This means that n0 must be large enough in order
to make the knowledge of trader 1 valuable. It is easy to convince oneself that
it is enough to replace n0 by n
′
0 = I
−1[I(n0) + 〈s〉] in the relevant equations,
and multiply all the gains by e〈s〉/2. For example, the optimal number of shares
that trader 1 invests if trader 0 has infinite capital is
n∗1,s = e
−〈s〉/γ n0
(1 + γ)1/γ
(6)
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From this equation one sees that n′0 = n0 exp(−〈s〉/γ). Since 〈s〉/γ ∼ 10 in
practice, the minimal amount of shares needed to create an arbitrage, denoted
by n0,min is increased about 20,000 folds by the spread. The respective values
of γ and 〈s〉 are not independent, and can be measured in real markets for a
given stock. In the language of [3], γ = 〈log(n)〉/R(1) where 〈log(n)〉 is the
average of the logarithm of transaction size and R(1) is the response function
after one time step. Using γ and 〈s〉 measured in Paris Stock Exchange one
finds that n0,min ∈ [1.210
4, 2.0108], with median of 1.2105 (Fig. 1), which is not
unrealistic for very liquid stocks. Indeed, the fraction of n0,min with respect to
the average daily volume of each stock ranges from ≃ 2% to more than 100%,
with a median of about 42%. Therefore, for most of the stocks, trader 0 needs
to trade less than two fifths of the daily average volume in one transaction
in order to be leave an exploitable arbitrage; for 12 stocks (18%), trading
less than 10% of the average daily volume suffices. It is unlikely that a single
trade is larger than the average daily volume, hence, 29 stocks (43%) do not
allow on average a single large trade to be exploitable by a simple round-trip.
Interestingly, stocks with average daily volumes smaller than about 105 are all
consistent from that point of view (Fig. 1). In addition, the stocks for which
n0,min < 〈V 〉 all have a κ > 0.945.
Therefore, the role of the spread is to increase considerably the minimum
size of the trade, which in some cases remain within reasonable bounds. The
mathematical discussions of the previous sections on log price impact functions
are therefore still valid, provided that one replaces n0 with n
′
0 = I
−1[I(n0)+s],
which is equivalent to rescaling n0 by exp(〈s〉/γ). Therefore, the spread must
be taken into account, but does not yield systematically consistent impact
functions for some stocks with a high enough daily volume.
5 Spread and feedback
The question is whether the feedback and the spread make impact function
systematically consistent. The stocks that are the most likely to become con-
sistent are those whose n0,min/〈V 〉 < 1 is large while having a strong feedback.
According to Fig. 2, these properties are compatible.
Using for each stock 〈s〉, κ, and γ from the data, we find that three additional
stocks are made consistent by feedback on trader 0’s market order side alone:
the feedback limited to one side of the order book, even when the spread is
taken into account, is insufficient. However, adding finally the feedback on
both book sides makes consistent all the stocks, even in the case of infinite
capital. Therefore, both the spread and the feedback are crucial ingredients of
consistency at the smallest time scale.
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6 Conclusion
The paradox proposed in this paper provides an a contrario simple and nec-
essary condition of consistency for price impact functions. And indeed, fi-
nancial markets ensure consistent market price impact functions at the most
microscopic dynamical level by two essential ingredients: the spread and the
dynamics of the order book.
I am indebted to Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Julien Kockelkoren and Michele
Vettorazzo from CFM for their hospitality, measurements, and comments. It
is a pleasure to acknowledge discussions and comments from Doyne Farmer,
Sam Howison, Matteo Marsili, Sorin Solomon and David Bre´e.
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